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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

'

i JOHN MICHAEL KRYGER and

vJILLIAM FREDERICK STEWART,

i

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs-

Case No. 12073

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
, Jtah State Prison,
I

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants appeal from a decision of the
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, Judge, Third Judicial
'.listrict Court, denying the appellants t petition for

1

awrit of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LCWER COURT
John Michael Kryger and William Frederick Stewart
:Plead guilty to the crime of robbery on the 10th day
of June, 1968, in the District Court, Third Judicial
'~.

1'1strict, State of Utah.

I

On December 29, 1969, a

1Petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the
.Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County.
~esponse

A

of the Attorney General was duly filed and
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pre-trial held on the matter.
1

'
1

Hearing was held on the

ioth day of April, 1970, before the Honorable Leonard
\v. Elton and on the 15th day of April, 1970, Judge Elton

entered an Order denying the appellants' relief under
: their petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
decision denying their petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 15, 1968, a robbery occurred in
'.;alt Lake County.

(R. 33)

Thereafter the petitioners,

Kryger and Stewart, were charged with the robbery.
, They plead guilty to the crime of robbery and subse•quently filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus
·alleging that their pleas of guilty were not voluntarily
. entered.

(R. 1)

The appellants alleged that their

pleas of guilty were the result of Kryger being sub. jected to an illegal lineup, that Kryger gave a conI

:fession under circumstances that rendered it illegal
in Stewart's case as well as Kryger's, evidence was
I

obtained against them as a result of an illegal search
and seizure.

The only testimony offered at the hearing
-2-
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on the appellants' complaint for habeas corpus was
that of the appellants.

The State offered no testimony

to rebut their contentions.

Kryger testified that he

was arrested on May 15, 1968 at approximately 1: 00 A. M.
(R. 33)

He was pulled over at a store, his car was

searched and he was ordered to stand on the sidewalk
while another car circled around the road a few times.
(R. 33)
1

At that time Kryger was apparently identified

as being one of the perpetrators of a robbery which had
occurred earlier.

He was not advised of his right to

have counsel present at the lineup.

He was identified

apparently as having been involved in a robbery of a
service station.

(R. 34) He was then taken to the

police station where he was interrogated.

He was told

that if he didn't give a confession he was going to
11

serve time - a lot of time .," .," .,""

~s

He was not advised

to any of his constitutional rights.

As a result

of the coercion and interrogation he confessed to

robbing a service station with William Stewart and
told the officers where a knife was located which had
apparently been used in the robbery.
He

(R. 37-38)

did not give the officers permission to search the

apartment where the knife was located.
-3 -

At the time
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of preliminary hearing the testimony of the confession,
' t1
I

knife, whiC'h was subsequently recovered from his

apartment, and the identification was used against

i

him.
~Mr.

He testified that this effected his plea. (R. 39-4
Kryger was represented by counsel but counsel did

i

[not discuss the question of the lineup, his confession

or the use of evidence obtained from the apartment
I

against him.

(R. 41)

There was apparently no dis -

cussion to the effect that possibly these items of
evidence could not be used in a prosecution in the
District Court.
William Stewart testified that he was in his
apartment on the 15th of May, 1968, and at approximately
4: 00 A. M. in the morning he was awakened by officers
from the Salt Lake City Police Department.
i

(R. 48)

He was immediately placed under arrest and asked where

the knife was located.

He was given no advice of his

right to remain silent or of the other elements of

the Miranda warning.

(R. 4 9)

He did not give a

statement to the police and a search of his apartment
disclosed nothing.

Subsequently, the police returned

to the apartment without a warrant, searched the
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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: apartment and f ouncl tlw knif0.
!

(R. 4 9, 58, 62)

At

the time of preliminary hearing, Kryger' s statement

[implicating Stewart was admitted into evidence (R. 50)
: as was the knife taken from the apartment.

There was

no discussion with Stewart's attorney, who also repre-

sented Kryger, concerning the search nor any discussion

of a search warrant (R. 55, 62)

Stewart said that his

attorney felt that they had a weapon and a confession
and that this was sufficient to make out a good case
against him.

(R. 56)

Based upon evidence at prelim-

inary hearing and counsel rs statement, he entered a
plea of guilty.

Neither Kryger or Stewart had graduated from high
I

: school and Stewart had only a ninth grade education.
ARGUJ:v1ENT
POINT

I

TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORFUS SHaJLD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE UNCONTESTED EVIDENCE DISCLOSES
THAT APPELLANTS' PLEAS OF GUILTY WERE INDUCED
AS A RESULT OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE.
At the time that the appellants filed their
Petition for writ of habeas corpus, and at the time of
hearing before the trial court, the United States
0

1

Upreme Court had not decided the cases of McMann v.

1

I Richardson

'

U.S.

---

, 90

s.

Ct. 1441; Parker v.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I
~

North Carolina,

U.S.

, 90 S. Ct. 1458 (1970);

'

i and Brady v. United States,
I
1

I

90 S. Ct. 1463.

At the

time the appellants filed their petition the law was
~enerally

to the effect that a plea of guilty induced

by an illegal confession or illegally obtained evidence

could not be deemed a voluntary plea.

See Brennan,

Dissenting, McMann v. Richardson, supra, 90
F.N. 2.

s.

Ct. 1451,

However, the appellants submit that their

case is not controlled by the principles of McMann v.
nchardson, supra, Parker v. North Carolina, supra, or
Brady v. United States, supra.

In the instant case,

holding Kryger for identification without affording
i him

an opportunity to have counsel present was arguably

a violation of the United States Supreme Court's decisior
·~United

States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), since

there may have been no adequate basis for arrest,
::,fong Sun v. United States; Nedrud, The Supreme Court
and the Law of Criminal Investigation, 145-148.

Subsequent to his arrest, Kryger was taken to the Salt
: Lake Police Department where he was interrogated without

being warned of his constitutional rights.

The failure

to advise Kryger prior to the interrogation was a clear
Violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
-6-
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and rendered his confession involuntary and inadmissible·
Further, the coupling of the threats with the absence
I

of a warning rendered the confession involuntary

I

2specially in light of the limited education of the
appellant, and the circwnstances surrounding the

!

interrogation.

Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963

Lynumn v. Illinois, 272 U.S. 528 (1963).

In addition,

9oth Kryger and Stewart at the preliminary hearing were
f,1ced with the lineup, the illegal confession and
~vidence

illegally seized.

The use of the confession

8f Kryger against Stewart would not be constitutionally
I permissible

at the time of trial.

Indeed, both men

:could not be tried in a common trial if Kryger' s confession were to be introduced against him.

Bruton v.

I

'1Jnited States, 3 91 U.S. 123 (1968).
I
The police entered the apartment of Stewart after
1his arrest, after he had been taken to jail, and after
, ;,

prior search of the apartment had been made and

:'mcovered.

nothin~

The search was without the consent of either

:\tewart or Kryger.
\used in the robbery.

They recovered a knife apparently
This search and the seizure of

/the knife was without consent, without warrant, nor

I

[incident to arrest and was thus clearly unconstitutional.
II

l~~r v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Recznik v.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

-

, city of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166 (1968); Shipley v.
'

I

i ~ifornia, 395

u.;;. 818 (1969); Preston v. United

States, 376 U. .<;. 364 (1964).

The undisputed testimony

of Kryger and Stewart was to the ef feet that the

: illegally obtained and tainted evidence directed
, induced their pleas of guilty.
i

i

I

Kryger further testified)

that there was no discussion with his attorney con-

1

i cerning his confession, the lineup, or the apparent

I

illegal search and seizure.

(R. 41)

Stewart testified

that there was no discussion with counsel concerning
( the search, and he also testified that the attorney
r

had indicated that since there was a confession
and evidence uncovered at a search, a plea of guilty
'i'las in order.

It is submitted in the first instance

that this case is within both of the two exceptions
to the rule in McMann that a plea of guilty cures non
jurisdictional deficiencies.

The first exception is

that this case presents a circumstance where the
coercion of Kryger had an abiding and continuing impact
so as to taint his plea.
441, pg. 44 7.
~lice

McMann v. Richardson, 90 S. Cy

Certainly there was nothing done by the

or appointed counsel to dispel the impact of

t~ confession, the lineup or the search.

In addition,

~yger was exposed to the confession being used against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

I

him at the preliminary hearing.

This would appear to

bring the matter well within the Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940) exception noted in McMann.

In

'McMann v. Richardson, supra, the court stated the rule
: 3.S

fallows :
nrn our view a defendant's plea of guilty
based on reasonably competent advice is an
intelligent plea not open to attack on the
grounds that counsel may have misjudged the
admissibility of the defendant's confession.
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent
and therefore vulnerable when motivated
by a confession erroneously thought admissible
in evidence depends as an initial matter not
on whether a court would retrospectively
consider counsel's advise to be right or
wrong, but on whether that advice was within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases. On the one hand, uncertainty
is inherent in predicting court decisions; but
on the other hand defendants facing felon
c arges are entitled to the e ective assistance
of competent counsel. Beyond this we think the
matter, for the most part, should be left to
the good sense and discretion of the trial
courts with the admonition that if the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot
be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel,
and that judges should strive to maintain
proper standards of performance by attorneys
who are representing defendants in criminal
cases in their courts.n (Emphasis added)

I

This is not a case where it can be said that counsel's

advice was within the range of competence demanded
by attorneys in criminal cases.

Alires v. Turner,

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22 U.2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969).
r

The state did not

call counsel to rebut the testimony of Kryger and
Stewart that there was no discussion concerning the
alleged illegally obtained evidence or that in fact
the attorney felt that there was a good case against
the petitioners.

The evidence as it is now before the

court clearly supports a determination that Kryger's
confession was illegally extracted, and that the knife
taken from the apartment was obtained as a result of
illegal search and seizure.

Further, there is no

rebuttle to the assertion that counsel did not discuss
the legal implications of these matters with appellants.
This is not a case like Brady v. United States and
Parker v. North Carolina, where counsel would have
been required to anticipate future Supreme Court
decisions.

The law was clear.

Under these circumstancE

it is submitted that McMann v. Richardson compels a
determination that the plea of guilty of the appellants
was not free and voluntary but the product of illegally
obtained evidence.
-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE APPELLANTS' PLEA OF GUILTY WAS ACCEPTED
IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Appellants submit, that assuming that their plea
I is

controlled by the decision of McMann v. Richardson,

supra, as respects their federal constitutional
allegations, that this court should rule that their
pleas cannot stand under Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.

The McMann v.

Richardson, supra, decision is a distinct minority
expression as respects overall judicial evaluation on
the issue of whether a plea of guilty will be deemed
voluntarily entered in the face of illegally obtained
evidence.

Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154 CC.A. 5th Cir.

, 1969); United States ex rel. McCloud v. Rundle, 402

F.2d 853 CC.A. 3d Cir. 1968); Kott v. Green, 387 F.2d
136 (C.A. 6th Cir.1967); Reed v. Henderson, 385 F.2d
1 995 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel.
I

I

QQllins v. Maroney, 382 F.2d 547 (C.A.3d Cir.1967);

I

~iley

v. Wilson, 378 F.2d 144 cc.A.9th Cir.1967);

I

·Carpenter v. Wainwright, 372 F.2d 940 CC.A. 5th Cir.
1967); Doran v. Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 CC.A.9th Cir.

1966); White v. Pepersack, 352 F.2d 470 CC.A.4th Cir.
: 1965); Zachery
v. Hale, 286 F. Supp. 237 (D.C.M.D.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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na.1968); United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle,
285 F. Supp. 647 (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1966); People v. Spencer,
j

66 Cal.2d 158, 57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715 (1967);

'i'

corrunonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 237 A.2d 172 (1968).1
The overwheJming weight of judicial consideration
rejects the proposition that a person who enters a plea
of guilty as a result of illegally obtained evidence

) enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.
) Substantial reason militates against the position taken
i by
1
:

the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson, supra.

The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are settled

without trial upon a plea of guilty.

The purpose for

I the exclusionary rule adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643 (1961) was to deter police activity which violated
the 4th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States and may be criminal (18 U.S.C. 241, etc.)
or at least tortious.
(1961).

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167

If officers may now believe that if an accused

Pleads guilty the fruits of their illegal activity
, Will be justified the reason for complying with
!

, constitutional standards will be diluted.

It is

! submitted that the better rule would be that urged

i

) by the dissenting opinions in McMann and that this

\ court should determine that due process of law under

I
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!

the Constitution of the State of Utah is violated where ,

an accused rs plea is a result of illegally obtained

evidence.
CONCLUSION
The pleas of guilty entered by the appellants in
the instant case were as a result of illegally obtained

evidence and unconstitutional police practices.

The

decisions of the United States Supreme Court in McMann
v. Richardson, supra, does not support a conclusion
!

that the pleas were voluntarily entered since there

) was not the adequate consultation with counsel that

I

i

i

the McMann case requires.

Further, as a matter of stat

constitutional law, the pleas were taken in violation
of due process.

This court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
Attorney for Appellants

-13-
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